



Madisonian Republicanism has a showdown with
Progressivism in the Arizona redistricting case
Last week oral arguments began at the Supreme Court on the state of Arizona’s use of an
independent commission to conduct the redistricting process once every decade, with the state’s
Republican-led legislature arguing that the commission is unconstitutional. Keith Gaddie writes
that the disagreement centers on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term ‘legislature’, with
those who are against the reform supporting a Madisonian interpretation that the legislature is
solely the representative body, and not the legislative process. He argues that if the Supreme
Court finds for the Arizona legislature, this will invest substantial power in state legislatures, and
limit people’s ability to determine where political power should reside in their states.
Redistricting litigation is rarely really about process. Instead, it is about power – who has it, who uses it, and how
it is used to determine who will have power in the future.  In Arizona, different sets of elites are fighting for control
of this power, and the outcome of the case holds real consequences for the ability of the public to control their
government through direct democracy.
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission  challenges the constitutionality of the
independent redistricting commission created by Arizona voters in Prop 106. This amendment to Arizona’s
constitution limits the legislature’s role in the redistricting process to the appointment of commissioners. The case
raises two questions important to the future of U.S. redistricting reform: Can states use means other than direct
legislative action to create congressional districts?  And did Congress authorize such means?
This case hinges on the high court’s interpretation of one term, ‘legislature.’ Art. I, s. 4 of the U.S. Constitution
states that the “[t]he times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof” (emphasis added).  Is a legislature only a representative
body, elected by the people? Or, is it the legislative process encompassing the corpus of means by which a state
might enact law under the state constitution? Appellants advance the former, literal interpretation which is
invested in the Madisonian Republican tradition.
Defenders of the Arizona reform contend that it means the latter, and point to precedent which that the word
‘legislature’ encompasses the legislative process, including referenda and initiative. But this precedent is
potentially soft according to the Arizona appellants , because in previous cases the redistricting processes
“expressly contemplate a continuing major role” for the legislature; the Arizona reform limits legislative leadership
to selecting four of five commissioners from a prescribed bipartisan/non-partisan list, and then exits the
redistricting process.
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A second consideration is the latitude made available by the balance of Art. I, s. 4, which states that Congress
can “make or alter such regulations” to conduct elections. Congress used this power to ban multimember districts
in 1842, and then to ban at-large statewide House elections in 1967, leaving single-member districts as the only
means to elect congressmen.  In 1929 Congress granted by statute to any state the authority to determine district
boundaries via means   “prescribed by the law of such State,” and this statute withstood litigation on other
grounds in 1932.   By the logic of this second part of Art. I, sec. 4, Arizona’s commission should stand. State
constitutions are the highest form of state law. If Arizonans see fit to limit the ability of lawmakers to shape
legislative boundaries, and they do so through a legal mechanism then they could do so via these statutory
grants. In opinion polls, Americans continue to view the redistricting process as corrupted, and the actions of
Arizona and more recently California are consistent with the intended use of initiative and referenda.  Indeed, the
Court has long held that the ability to use initiative and referenda was an avenue available to the people, in order
to correct for unfair redistricting.
Courts change. And so to does the understanding and interpretation of words and law. Herein resides the heart of
the real conflict that sits before the Supreme Court – the ongoing tension to pull back from the impulses of the
20th century. From 1898 to 1918, 26 states adopted direct democracy to their constitutions in order to reform
corrupted, compromised legislative processes that had been captured by a few narrow interests. In the American
Progressive era, reformers recoiled against hyperpartisanship and a political spoils system that favored a few
narrow economic elites.  The introduction of these reforms altered the legislative process, as it evolved from the
time of Madison and Jefferson, to encompass new and more direct forms of lawmaking.
The late Robert Dahl pointed out that the Framers operated under a ‘profound ignorance’ of the future. Madison
and his cohort crafted a constitution that had difficulty embracing new forms of democratic government. The
Framers underestimated the ability of the franchise to act with wisdom and protect property rights.  As technology
and American civilization progressed, the institutionalization of the roles of legislatures and the use of terms
bound in time created tensions with new and durable political movements such as progressivism.   For a century
these conflicts have been reconciled through the application of interpretation of the Constitution.
But how will the Roberts Court act? And what are the consequences for progressivism? This Court has a
progressive wing, a conservative wing, and there is no stable ideological majority from issue to issue. The Court is
peculiar in this respect – it has found majorities for most every impulse. It has its libertarian moments, such as the
expansion of privacy rights to encompass mobile electronic devices. It finds expansive authority to more broadly
define marriage rights. It defies a sense of its ideology by sustaining a broad-based health care reform through
Congress’s legislative authority to tax. But, it also pushed back against a major civil rights law, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, based on highly technical grounds regarding the nature of the coverage formula to implement the law.
The oral arguments did not bode well for the survival of the Arizona commission. The progressive case for
defining the legislature broadly found little support from the bench. If the Supreme Court finds for the Arizona
legislature, it will circumscribe the ability of the people to reform their electoral institutions, and also invest
substantial power in an institution that the Framers of the 18th century and the Progressives of the 20th century
did not trust – state legislatures. In so doing, it will limit the ability of the people to determine where political power
shall reside in their states.
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